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1.  Introduction 
The Pythagorean tradition dominates the understanding of beauty up until the 
end of the 18th Century.  According to this tradition, the experience of beauty 
is stimulated by certain relations perceived to be between an object/construct's 
elements.  As such, the object of the experience of beauty is indeterminate: it 
has neither a determinate perceptual analogue (one cannot simply identify 
beauty as you can a straight line or a particular shape) nor a determinate 
concept (there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for beauty at the 
semantic level).  By the 13th Century in the West, the pleasure experienced in 
beauty is characterized as disinterested.  Yet, on the basis that all cultural 
manifestations of the pythagorean theory of beauty recognize that judgments 
of beauty are genuine judgments, we would want to say that judgments of 
beauty are lawful.  In addition, from ancient times, up until after Kant, 
philosophers of beauty within this tradition recognize two kinds of beauty: a 
universal, unchanging beauty coexisting with a relative, dynamic beauty.2  
These two kinds of beauty and the tensions discussed above, are reconciled 
and dissolved respectively, according to the metaphysical/religious 
commitments of the particular author.  As yet, however, these features of 
beauty have not been reconciled within a physicalist worldview.  This is what 
I set out to do. 
The aim of this paper, then, is to outline a way of thinking about 
beauty which resolves these apparent contradictions.  An explanatory 
hypothesis for beauty is developed, which draws upon recent developments in 
cognitive science3.  A theory of perception needs to satisfy certain conditions 
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in order to explain the features of beauty in such a way that they are 
complementary rather than dichotomous.  This paper begins by uncovering 
the nature of these conditions, and considering whether contemporary theories 
of perception satisfy them.  Finally, an outline of a new way of thinking about 
beauty emerges whose relevance for understanding contemporary art is then 
examined.  But first, a brief history of beauty is in order. 
2.  The Pythagorean Tradition of Beauty4. 
the rays of the noumenal world filtering through the phenomenal world  
In the above quote, Robert Zimmerman5 is referring to the aesthetic 
experience according to Immanuel Kant.  The noumenal world is the world as 
it objectively is, independent of our perceptions of it: the world as we can 
never know it.  The phenomenal world is the world as it appears to us: we can 
only know the world through the constraints imposed by our perceptual 
apparatus.  However, according to Zimmerman’s interpretation of Kant, the 
aesthetic experience allows us to glimpse something of the noumenal world.  
This idea reflects something of the ‘otherworldly’ feel to the aesthetic 
experience: the 'hard to characterize' quality of beauty. 
This peculiar quality of our experience of beauty is reflected in the 
explanations given of beauty throughout history.  For example, in ancient 
times, beauty was interpreted as connecting the perceiver with a 
consciousness or a state of being which existed beyond the material world.  
According to Plato, beauty, though instantiated in objects, was a transcendent 
entity.  The phenomenology of beauty highlights that paradox of beauty which 
the hypothesis presented in this paper attempts to explain.  The paradox, as 
evidenced in Plato's Phaedrus, is that the perception of beauty, though 
apparently the perception of a property of particular objects, at the same time 
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feels as though it is a recognition of some greater truth about the nature of 
things: a truth already known a priori by the perceiver. 
In medieval times, the perception of beauty was understood to 
facilitate self-transcendence; a feeling of being in harmony with others or 
something beyond the self.6  It was believed that the experience of beauty 
connected the individual to the divine.  However, against this universal 
subjective response to beauty, was the objective nature of beauty.  Just as, 
according to Plato (and Aristotle7), beauty was manifested in objects as an 
organic unity, according to Thomas Aquinas, beauty manifested itself in 
objects and events as an order and harmony.8  Kant’s construal of the problem 
of beauty as involving an antinomy caused by the apparent subjectivity and 
universality of beauty had previously emerged in the work of ancient and 
medieval thinkers.  That is, it was recognized that the experience of beauty 
involved a certain type of response and a certain type of stimulus.  The 
stimulus evoked a perceptual harmony and order because of the constitution 
of its parts.  By the medieval period, the response to this perceptual harmony 
and order was already being characterized as a pure and disinterested 
pleasure.9 
The true nature of beauty was a central philosophical question in 
eighteenth century philosophy.  The ideas on the subject developed at this 
time, are most notably formulated by David Hume10 , and Kant11.  During this 
period, the experience of beauty is ultimately associated with a particular kind 
of perceptual act of a particular type of object, usually an art object or an 
object of nature.  However, Hume and Kant emphasize different aspects of the 
interaction between the perceiver and the object judged to be beautiful.  
According to Hume, the perception of beauty involves a certain response on 
the part of the perceiver which is conditional on the perceiver having a sense 
of beauty.  However, his actual identification of beauty tends to direct us 
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towards searching the beautiful object for its defining characteristics.  
According to Hume: 
 
Beauty is such an order and constitution of parts as 
either by the primary constitution of our nature, by 
custom, or by caprice is fitted to give a pleasure and 
satisfaction to the soul.12 
 
Kant, on the other hand, directs our attention to reasoning what 
perceptual/cognitive conditions must exist in the perceiver in order to explain 
the way in which we experience beauty.  For example, he reasoned that the 
basis of a disinterested pleasure must be universal as no personal grounds 
come into it.  This led into his speculation regarding the origins of the 
universality of judgments of beauty.  According to Kant, the judgment of 
beauty can be thought of as universal because the basis of the experience of 
beauty is perceptual form and this basis is intersubjective.  So Kant provides a 
lawful basis to judgments of beauty without providing necessary and 
sufficient conditions for beauty at the semantic level.  The antinomy that Kant 
sets out to solve is represented by Mary Mothersill13 as a matter of needing to 
reconcile two apparently contradictory theses.  These are (first thesis) that 
there are no principles of beauty (no properties in the object which are 
logically necessary and sufficient to an object being beautiful); and (second 
thesis) that there are genuine judgments of beauty.  I call Mothersill's first 
thesis, the ineffability thesis; and her second thesis, the lawful thesis.  
Mothersill suggests at one point that if principles of beauty were 
neurophysiological or psychological conditions14 then there would be grounds 
for genuine judgments of beauty which do not translate into properties in the 
object which are logically necessary and sufficient to an object being judged 
beautiful.  She writes: 
 
aesthetic theory ... requires definitions and principles 
...[however] there is no reason to suppose that the 
principles must be principles of taste; and the 
supposition that the definitions of art or beauty that 
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philosophers have advanced are designed to 
promulgate principles of taste appears simply to be 
false15 
3.  Three Conditions of a Unified Theory of Beauty 
If we understand principles of beauty, not as properties in the object, but as 
principles which underlie the perceptual processes employed in the perception 
of certain objects, then there would be principles of beauty which do not lock 
us into the idea that there are stateable sufficient conditions for beauty.  That 
is, we could think of beauty as a relational property existing in the object by 
virtue of there being certain processes involved in the perceptual apparatus of 
the perceiver, of which she becomes aware in the course of perceiving 
beautiful objects.  In this way, the elements within Kant's antinomy as well as 
the two theses identified by Mothersill would be reconciled.  A judgment of 
beauty could be understood to be both universal and subjective based on the 
fact that the experience of beauty is an awareness of species-specific 
perceptual processes or principles.  If an awareness of these principles were 
pleasurable in themselves, it would be a disinterested pleasure, quite distinct 
from pleasure of the sensuous or pleasure experienced in the good.  While 
there would be no principles which translate into necessary or sufficient 
conditions for beauty at the semantic level, there would still be grounds for 
genuine judgments of beauty.  Hence beauty's universality (lawfulness) and 
subjectivity (ineffability) would be complementary features of beauty. 
The title of this paper suggests that I will be providing an outline or 
approach to a theory of beauty which will encompass all manifestations of 
beauty.  The problem emerges, however, that if we explain beauty according 
to an awareness of certain perceptual principles, the possibility of 
mathematical, scientific, moral and intellectual beauty would seem to be 
precluded.  In order to accommodate these kinds of beauty within the 
explanation provided for perceptual beauty, perceptual principles would need 
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to figure in, either analogously or in some parallel way, higher level 
judgments of a cognitive kind. 
In order to accommodate the idea of beauty emerging here, then, a 
perceptual theory would need to (i) include a stage of perceptual processing 
that was responsible for the construction of perceptual form, which we could 
validly  distinguish from other operations and processes; (ii) posit principles 
or assumptions about the physical world embedded in the system which 
constrained the construction of perceptual form and were accessible to 
consciousness; and (iii)  include the possibility that  perceptual principles 
could figure in, either analogously or in some parallel way, higher level 
judgments of a cognitive kind. 
3.1  The First Condition of a unified theory of beauty; perceptual form 
In this paper I use vision as my model of perception for two reasons.  
First, there is more research carried out on vision than on other perceptual 
modules and secondly, the visual arts are my favoured art form for discussion.  
I could add a third reason, that vision is paradigmatic of how perception 
operates but that would demand the kind of argument and evidence for which 
there is no room here.  For the purposes of this paper, let us assume that the 
auditory and haptic perceptual modules both involve analogous form-making 
principles to vision16. 
The problem of vision is to work out how our cognitive systems can 
arrive at a reliable interpretation of the world from the varying light intensities 
that hit the retina (the equivalent problem in sound is how we hear word-
sounds instead of letter-sounds or whole sounds like passages of music rather 
than just the elemental auditory vibrations which make up the sound).  The 
mathematician and neuroscientist David Marr, in an attempt to solve this 
problem for vision, envisaged the visual system as an ascending hierarchy of 
representations, which were data driven and largely bottom up.  Put very 
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simply, Marr's idea was that the perceptual system groups pixels of light of 
similar intensity and close proximity into angles, lines, shapes.  With the help 
of constraints imposed by inbuilt assumptions about how the world is, these 
elements are further decoded and transformed into representations which 
provide information about shapes/forms and their position within space.  
Because of the speed at which we extract this information, and the automatic 
and mandatory nature of this process, Marr reasoned that this transformation 
from the retinocentric image into a 3D image must operate, by and large, 
independently of processes which draw upon explicit higher level knowledge 
(semantic and naming).  This assumption is supported by evidence that 
humans can perceive shapes in depth without prior knowledge (Bela Julesz 
stereograms17).  Furthermore, Marr drew upon the work of the psychologists 
E. K.Warrington and P. Rabin18 whose study of patients with parietal lesions 
found that it was possible to recover the 3D shape of an object which 
projected an uncharacteristic angle to the viewer even when the patient had no 
accessible semantic or naming knowledge of the object.19  Marr concluded 
that vision can solve the problem of building a description of shape and 
positions of objects from images, independently of object recognition20.  
Further evidence for a separation of structural, semantic and naming stages is 
provided by neuropsychological studies conducted more recently by Glyn 
Humphreys et al.  This evidence supports the idea that vision is made up of a 
number of small modules, 'at least in so far as the processing of independent 
specifiable image properties is concerned (e.g. depth and motion being 
separated from the processing of form).'21   Colour is significant at this level in 
providing information about tone (much as Cezanne relied on the 
juxtapositioning of certain colours to create the illusion of form; the colours in 
his paintings are not characteristically chosen for their sensuous properties).  
Clearly distinguishing form-construction as a distinct perceptual process, 
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which is a reasonably safe assumption to make, is the first stage in 
establishing the possibility of perceptual principles of form-construction. 
3.2  Principles of perceptual form: the second condition. 
What is important is whether there can rightly be understood to be 
principles of form embedded in the visual system's operations of which we 
can become aware in a limited kind of way (in the sense that we cannot be 
aware of their source phenomenologically and we cannot accurately match 
them with language schemata).  This would explain how these principles can 
be universal-subjective; and lawful-ineffable.  It would also explain why the 
object of an experience of beauty is indeterminate both perceptually and 
conceptually, given that the principles of which we become aware in an 
experience of beauty, would constitute a part of the architecture of the mind.  
How an awareness of these principles of form could produce an experience of 
beauty would need to be explored at the neurological level; for example, by 
examining the connections between areas of the brain responsible for form-
construction and the emotional centres, specifically pleasure-centres of the 
brain.  However, for the purposes of this paper, it is enough to consider how 
our way of thinking about beauty might be changed, if the explanatory 
hypothesis presented in this paper were true. 
Representational theories of vision based on the belief that the output 
of visual processing is underdetermined in the proximal stimulus usually 
envisage visual processing as stimulus driven but supplemented with innate 
assumptions.  Marr posited that, embedded in the visual system, there are 
rules or laws about the way forms are spatially constructed.  These are the 
rules that transform the retinocentric image into an object-centred image in 
such a way that just one mental description of an object is constructed (during 
the course of perception) regardless of its projected angle to the viewer.  Marr 
emphasized that these laws would be about the real world, understood as such 
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presumably because they would have evolved as a result of survival pressures 
on the organism; for example, assumptions like 'all objects are rigid' or 'there 
are relatively few connected surfaces'22.  Such assumptions would prompt a 
certain transformation over another, and would be automatic, mandatory and 
usually unconscious.  Furthermore, as Frances Egan points out: 
 
It is important to note that these assumptions are not assumed 
to be explicitly represented in the visual system.  The 
assumptions are incorporated in the mechanism only in the 
following sense - the mechanism operates in such a way that if 
the assumptions are true of the subject's normal environment it 
will succeed in recovering information about the environment 
from information in the image.23 
 
Marr observes that an occluding contour (like the boundary of a 
silhouette) can provide enough information for us to recover the geometry of a 
whole shape in generalized form.  In an example of reverse engineering, Marr 
reasons that three assumptions must be built into the process for this to be 
possible.  These are: (i) each point on the contour generator projects to a 
different point on the contour; (ii) nearby points on the contour arise from 
nearby points on the contour generator; and (iii) the contour generator lies 
wholly in a single plane.  The cognitive psychologist Ilona Roth points out 
that the inbuilt assumptions that Marr reasons must constrain the construction 
of perceptual form are in line with Gestalt principles24.  The Gestalt principles 
are: the law of proximity, the law of similarity, the law of good continuity, the 
law of closure.  These laws are manifestations of the more basic Law of 
Pragnanz; 'Of several geometrically possible organizations, that one will 
actually occur which possesses the best, simplest and most stable shape'.  
According to Roth, however, Gestalt psychologists did not have the means to 
ascertain how these principles might actually work.  It has been left to 
experimental and computational investigations to reinterpret perceptual 
grouping as a stage that operates on simpler elements such as edge segments, 
initially extracted from the retinal image, and to posit the kind of constraints 
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the system would need to impose in order to achieve the transformation.  Irvin 
Rock, in a move which in hindsight can be interpreted as a bridge between 
Gestalt principles and Marr's assumptions, points out that it is not the simplest 
and most stable shape that the system prefers, but the simplest and most stable 
description underlying that shape, which in principle could result in the most 
complicated shape being extracted, or constructed, from the retinocentric 
image25.  According to Marr's model, shape descriptions are constructed of 
cylinders, principal axes (which provide information about elongation and 
symmetry), and volumetric primitives which are constructed around the axes.  
The assumptions involved in selecting these elements from the image serve to 
make explicit the organization of the space occupied by an object and not just 
its visible surfaces26.  Consider that a description of principal axes and 
volumetric primitives would not contain information about the object seen 
from only one angle (like the viewer-centred image) but would represent the 
three dimensional hierarchical decomposition of the object into segments. 
More recently the psychologist Irving Biederman has developed the 
geon theory in which instead of Marr's orientational and volumetric 
primitives, there are twenty-four volumetric primitives27.  These primitives, as 
with those posited by Marr, can be thought of as a kind of 'dialect of 
mentalese' according to the philosopher Stephen Pinker; a visual language in 
terms of which all objects are constructed and perceived28.  However Pinker, 
drawing upon experiments he conducted with the psychologist Michael Tarr, 
concluded that shape analysis is more likely to be a combination of a number 
of different kinds of processes.  The process might include detecting geons, or 
mental rotation or matching with templates or some combination of these.  In 
addition Pinker and Tarr found that detecting dominant axes was a significant 
part of shape analysis (form construction)29.  In any case, it is sufficient for 
my purposes that there is a perceptual process responsible for the construction 
of perceptual form which we can think of as being constrained by certain 
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inbuilt assumptions or principles.  As the above discussion bears out, it is 
quite reasonable to assume this.  The next task is to explore the possibility that 
these underlying principles can be consciously accessible. 
To ascertain whether or not such principles could be accessible, we 
might first start with whether neural activity in the areas of the brain 
responsible for form construction is accessible to consciousness.  
Neuroscientists Francis Crick and Christoff Koch postulate that unless a visual 
area has a direct projection to the frontal cortex, 'the activities in that 
particular visual area will not enter visual awareness directly, because the 
activity of the frontal areas is needed to allow a person to report 
consciousness' They continue: 
 
'All we are hypothesizing is that the activity in V1 [which 
provides the dominant visual input to higher visual areas] 
does not directly enter awareness.  What does enter 
awareness, we believe, is some form of the neural activity 
in certain higher visual areas, because they project directly 
to prefrontal areas'30. 
 
The process involved in constructing perceptual form is a high level visual 
process.  Crich and Koch's research, then, suggests that some form of this 
activity can enter awareness.  This is not to establish proof for my second 
condition but merely that the evidence emerging from neuroanatomical and 
psychophysical studies of vision at present does not contravene the possibility 
that the principles underlying the process of the construction of perceptual 
form are accessible to consciousness (a mental state which has neither a 
determinate concept nor a determinate perceptual analogue)31 . 
3.3  Perception and cognition: the third condition. 
The third condition is the possibility that  perceptual principles could 
figure in, either analogously or in some parallel way, higher level judgments 
of a cognitive kind.  One way to envisage this as a possibility is to imagine 
that perceptual form can be constructed not only from bottom-up input into 
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perceptual modules but also from top-down input from cognitive systems into 
perceptual processes, even though we would not experience the resulting 
representation as perceptual form as such.  In this way, not only the relation 
between sensory or perceptual aspects of objects, but also the relation between 
concepts could count towards an experience of beauty.  An example of the 
kind of evidence needed in order to assume this can be found in the work of 
the cognitive psychologists Michael Posner and Marcus Raichle.  They drew 
upon experiments conducted on people using Positron Emission Tomography.  
They found that a signal that has left the areas of the brain responsible for 
higher level perceptual processes can re-enter that area from centers 
responsible for higher level cognitive tasks.32   That is, high level perceptual 
processes can operate on input that enters from cognitive centres of the brain 
rather than only on input that has entered through the specialized perceptual 
input channels.  Another example is the work of the psychologists Deborah 
Chambers and Daniel Reisberg, the results of whose work support the notion 
that high-level perceptual processes are responsible for mental imagery, which 
is a kind of representation that can be involved in high level cognitive tasks.33.  
At this point then, we can speculate that intellectual beauty can be 
accommodated by an explanatory hypothesis of beauty in which the 
experience of beauty is constituted by an awareness of certain perceptual 
principles in the course of perceiving/apprehending certain objects/constructs. 
4.  Beauty and Art 
4.1  Visual Art and Beauty 
We can further speculate about the way in which the relevant perceptual 
principles, prompted by certain objective characteristics in the object, need to 
be employed in order to be brought to our attention.  Perhaps certain relations 
in the object, in the course of being perceived, challenge or stretch the 
relevant perceptual principles in an unprecedented or non typical way.  On the 
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other hand, the relation of the elements within some objects, such as natural 
forms (and certain artworks, for example, the sculptures of Constantin 
Brancusi, 1876-1957), might epitomize the perceptual principles.  Perhaps 
when the principles are invoked in any way which is likely to draw our 
attention from straight-forward object recognition to the process of perception 
as a solution to a problem, then we are experiencing beauty.  That is, when it 
is as if the very process of perception itself is experienced as a resolution of 
tensions, or a solution to the problem of constructing a coherent form from an 
array of primitives, then we experience beauty. 
The contemporary Australian painter Jeffrey Smart34 sets up the visual 
elements in such a way that our search for a visual resolution is always 
rewarded but not without some tension along the way.  The fact that he uses 
everyday objects like street signs, road markings and trucks in his paintings to 
set up these purely visual symphonies does not dull the visual challenge; the 
solutions emerge from the relations between the visual elements (objects).  
The way the elements are arranged in his paintings give rise to one unified 
configuration.  According to the vision-scientist Glyn Humphries, there is a 
difference between the processes and principles involved in observing 'within 
object relations' as compared to those exercised in perceiving 'between object 
relations'35.  The former are such that when detected, the system perceives the 
elements so related as cohering within a discrete object rather then as elements 
of different objects.  Perhaps a painter like Smart, contrives relations between 
objects in his paintings that mimic 'within object relations' and that is why the 
perceptual principles employed come to our attention, and cause a 
disinterested pleasure, even though we are not aware of the basis of this 
pleasure.  'Within object relations' are those that give rise to a unified whole.  
When a composition is set up to mimic this unity between representations of 
objects, this would count as an unusual employment of these principles, an 
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unusual solution to the problem of perception, and hence we become aware of 
the perception of the painting as a solution. 
It might be objected, however, that while various cultures do seem to 
offer a universal experience of certain aesthetic constants, at the same time the 
various cultures can be said to have their own unique aesthetic.  For example, 
we can look at African sculptures, Japanese tea ceremonies and Byzantine 
religious icons and while we can enjoy their perceptual beauty, we may not be 
able to experience their intellectual beauty in the way someone whose 
worldview was saturated by the outlook exemplified in these works could.  If 
there were a constant perceptual kind of beauty and a dynamic intellectual 
component to the experience of beauty, the latter would explain the aspects of 
a culture's aesthetic which are inaccessible to the uninitiated. 
My hunch is that purely perceptual beauty is caused by a particular 
relation between objective properties of the object and certain species-specific 
perceptual principles and as such can be understood to be universal.  Perhaps, 
though, the kind of relations between perceptual elements which give rise to a 
unified whole can be experienced analogously between the elements of a 
conceptual construct.  This kind of apprehension could vary considerably in 
complexity; from the notion of a balanced approach to what a particular 
culture understands as the necessary components of a good life to the 
experience of mathematical beauty.  Intellectual beauty, from scientific beauty 
to moral beauty would demand a shared background of knowledge or a shared 
worldview.   
An example of a visual art form which evokes a response to perceptual 
and intellectual beauty while certain of its culturally embedded intellectual 
connotations may well be largely inaccessible to Western minds, is Australian 
aboriginal art.  While one unfamiliar with the particular aboriginal culture 
would not understand the work in the way a member of the particular 
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aboriginal group would, one could still respond to its perceptual form and 
certain aspects of its intellectual form.  Imagine an art critic who has no 
knowledge of the traditional art and culture of the Australian Aboriginal.  
While she would not understand the work in the same way as a person from 
the relevant cultural group, not understanding the exact meanings, 
interpretations or value placed upon the work as a member of the group 
would, there is still a common level of experience of the work.  The critic 
might, on studying, for example, the work of Emily Kame Kngwarreye (1910-
1996) called 'Ntange Dreaming' 198936, notice fine, carefully spaced marks, 
lines and dots, which she might experience as sensitively balanced and 
counterbalanced throughout the work.  Yet shifting her focus to the way that 
the various earth tones and white and black are juxtaposed, gives the 
impression of a fluctuation in relative weightings, which results in an 
ungraspable, unpredictable configuration of movements not only across the 
picture plane but backwards and forwards into the pictorial space.  This 
configuration must confound the assumptions posed by Marr as somehow 
represented in the visual system that 'surfaces are continuous' and 'objects are 
solid'.  Further prolonged contemplation of Kngwarreye's work can result in 
an involuntary shift in perception from moving dots to tonal groupings which 
result in the emergence of broadly defined shapes.  But it is impossible to hold 
this configuration indefinitely.  No sooner has this configuration appeared 
than it is lost again to an energetic array of exalted dots.  Enough basic visual 
primitives (dots, edges, tones, textures) are provided to occupy our visual 
system in a search for form which is continually tantalized but never 
permanently satisfied.  The configurations which we apprehend, from the slow 
throbbing movement of individual marks and dots across the picture plane to 
the virtual lines and shapes, which when configured bring a temporary 
stillness to the work; are constructed by our form-making principles as they 
search (normally unconsciously) for contours, and orientational and 
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volumetric primitives.  The uninitiated critic, the Aboriginal artist and her 
cultural community can all agree at this level, because this level of perceptual 
interaction with the world is universal.  What involves the intellect of a post-
modern viewer is the dynamic nature of the configurations.  The harmony and 
balance of the work seem tenuous and unstable: it is as if the painting's 
harmonies are revealed in real time but can be missed if the various possible 
configurations are not perceived.  This is not the static balance of a High 
Renaissance painting, nor the delicate overtures in the direction of balance of 
a traditional Japanese landscape; rather it is a rhythmic, throbbing, dynamic 
balance which challenges more established aesthetic canons. 
This is not to claim that all artefacts are made to serve the same 
purpose or evoke the same meanings; or even to claim that all people can 
overcome concerns extraneous to the experience of beauty.  If one's mind-set 
is that art is for complementing Edwardian furnishings, traditional tribal art 
might appear an aberration, as it did for the middle classes first introduced to 
African art in the early 20th century.  On the other hand, if you believe that 
the only art forms relevant to our age are installation and multi-media art, then 
traditional art forms will be perceived as aesthetically unrewarding.  Another 
obstacle to aesthetic appreciation can be if an art object's message or 
perceived meaning arouses the viewer's anger or disgust to a significant 
degree.  When this happens, it is unlikely that the viewer will be able to 
experience the work's perceptual beauty, because the attention will be arrested 
by the literal meaning of the work. 
When the relations within an object in the course of being perceived, 
violate the normal operations of perceptual principles, perhaps by not 
providing a stimulus which can lead to the construction of a coherent form, 
then we might experience the object as ugly.  However, some artworks 
designed to evade perceptual form construction can manage to elude ugliness.  
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Jackson Pollock's Blue Poles  (1952) entrances the eye with its skeins of paint 
seemingly on the move across the picture plane, and to some extent into the 
pictorial space such are the varying tonal weights of the overlapping dribbles 
and splashes of colour.  But it does not offer a solution to the construction of 
form; there is no resolution of spatial tensions.  Instead, the work keeps us at 
the level of the purely sensuous; pleasurable in the same way as physical 
pleasures but not the same as the disinterested pleasure of the experience of 
beauty. 
There are many extra-aesthetic reasons for various fashions.  A theory 
of beauty need not cover all fashions, nor the way we enjoy all artworks for 
that matter, because there are many other factors in human experience that can 
inform and drive such preferences and activities.  Maori tattoos and the 
elongated lips and necks of certain African tribes are associated with high 
status: this is partly why they are looked upon with approval by members of 
their communities.  There are a number of speculations as to why such trends 
took off in the first place but they need not concern a theory of beauty. 
It is possible for a work which arouses our response to beauty through 
its perceptual form, not to provide us with the phenomenologically more total 
beauty experience, which is a combination of relations emerging within and 
between its perceptual form and conceptual content.  It may be that the work 
simply doesn't provide the opportunity for the latter, or it may be that the 
viewer does not share the same worldview or metaphysical/aesthetic canons as 
the artist, which would preclude her from experiencing its intellectual beauty.  
For example, Impressionism can be aligned with an increasingly secular, 
analytical worldview, newly forming within an increasingly atomistic analysis 
of experience.  As contemporary aesthetics moves towards a more holistic 
worldview, Impressionism can appear naive or thwarted in its attempt to 
capture experience.  Cubism has often, if somewhat flippantly, been 
understood as the artistic expression of relativity.  It is probably better aligned 
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with quantum mechanics; a fracturing of the classic scientific deterministic 
worldview.  While many art works demand both a perceptual and intellectual 
engagement (the relations in the intellectual construct paralleling the relations 
between the perceptual components), some artworks reward one kind of 
engagement rather than the other with an experience of beauty. 
Intellectual constructs are beautiful when they are balanced, 
harmonious and unified, or achieve 'unity in variety' to take the Hutchesonian 
line, but our notions of what constitutes these qualities can and do change and 
develop.  A voiding feature of intellectual beauty is unilluminating ideas37, or 
ideas that are too general or obvious.  What counts towards these voiding 
features will also change over time, within the individual's and the society's 
life.  The point to be made here is that the fact that not all art evokes an 
experience of beauty is no more a threat to the possibility of beauty than the 
fact that not all mathematical and scientific theories evoke a response to 
beauty.  The intellectual beauty component of art, and scientific, mathematical 
theories is dynamic; it may take time for the public, and often those more 
established in the particular field, to catch up38.  Furthermore, the degree to 
which an artwork prompts you to respond intellectually to it rather than just 
perceptually, is the degree to which its beauty will be dynamic and relative, 
rather than constant and universal. 
4.2  Other forms of Art, and Beauty 
The outline of an explanation of beauty presented in this paper, assumes that 
beauty supervenes on the formal relations among and between the perceptual 
properties and/or the concepts of an object/construct.  I have discussed the 
idea of form above in relation to visual art.  What can we mean, however, 
when we talk about the aesthetic form of a poem, novel, a sonata or film? 
Monroe Beardsley in his discussion of form in literature39 discusses 
what he understands as all the possible elements which make up literary form.  
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He includes both the phonetic and semantic aspects.  He divides these further 
into sound textures (details of sound changes, relations between sounds); 
sound structures (structures definable in terms of sound rather than meaning, 
e.g. the sonnet); meaning textures (meanings of certain words, phrases, 
sentences and paragraphs) and meaning structures (plot - sequence of events 
considered in the order in which they occurred rather than the order in which 
they are narrated which is what is known as the story).  These categories can 
be further dissected and elaborated, and Beardsley does this, describing 
language forms such as qualities, diction, syntax, patterns and verbal designs. 
Now for meaning structure, Beardsley makes further illuminating 
distinctions.  The structure of a literary work according to Beardsley is the 
large-scale relationships within the work, the major connections40.  He singles 
out logical, narrative and dramatic structures.  Logical structures are made up 
of relationships connecting episodes; relationships that are evidential, 
consequential, definitive or deductive.  Narrative structure refers to 
relationships within the plot - the number of episodes or sequences of 
episodes, the story lines or plots and sub-plots - the parallels or contrasts 
between them (for example, they may have a complex, scattered movement or 
a direct repetitive motion).  Dramatic structure refers to regional qualities of 
movement - that is, the kinetic pattern, if you like, like the building and 
relaxation of tension - variations in the on-goingness of the work, its pace and 
momentum.  He further analyses the dramatic structure into episodes or 
sections of discourse with either an Introductory Quality (the preliminaries, 
the setting up of a scene), Exhibition Quality (the body of the piece) and the 
Conclusion Quality (the winding up).  Further structures he discusses are 
perspectival structures (relationship between speaker and his situation) and 
developmental structures (where the situation or the speaker's attitude changes 
in some way). 
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An important part of the form of literature are the relations set up 
between the dominant ideas or, in some cases, the images created and the 
subordinate ideas/images - the themes which emerge and the relation between 
these - developments, changes, contrasts, parallels.  What Beardsley refers to 
as 'the kinetic curve' of a literary work may largely be mapped as 
developments to, and from, scenes of greater or less climax: 'the reversal, the 
confrontation, the revelation, the showdown, the death'41.  The pattern of 
episodes created may be sequential, logical: a smooth continuous rise and fall 
of tension where the sequence is in some way expected or looked forward to.  
Or it may have a more disjointed feel when possible interpretations are invited 
and are multifarious, giving a more unexpected, difficult to grasp overall 
structure to the work.  In some works the unity sought will be continually 
frustrated: but the work will arouse notions of unity even if only by drawing 
the reader's attention to the unity expected but not revealed.  What this unity 
refers to is the aesthetic form of literature.  The aesthetic form is constructed 
over time.  Consider the time it takes to read a literary work; the gaps between 
the reading times and so on.  Grasping the form occurs with the apprehension 
of the plot/s, the apprehension of the intricacies and complexities of the 
various elements of structure.  If we re-engage with the story on returning to it 
after a break, we also set up the elements of structure.  How well we 
apprehend the form will depend on the quality of our engagement with the 
work.  Certain contemporary literary styles only intimate the structure, leaving 
it to the reader to fill in the details of interpretation which the reader normally 
does in a trial and error way until a unity of meaning is revealed.  Literary 
works can challenge aesthetic canons or stabilize emerging ones through 
habituation just as other art forms and new scientific theories can. 
Absolute music presents an example of an art form which can be 
experienced either as perceptual beauty, or as a combination of both 
perceptual and intellectual beauty.  Certain philosophers of music imply that 
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there is only one way to validly experience the beauty of music and that is 
perceptually.  According to Peter Kivy, the musical work's structure is its 
essential characteristic.  Various renditions or interpretations of the work can 
still be judged to be that work according to the degree that the same relative 
sounds within the performance are achieved42.  Others insist that both form 
and content can contribute to music's beauty but then proceed to conflate 
content with form.  Eduard Hanslick believed that the content of music was 
tonally moving forms43.  The explanation of structure in literary works 
described by Beardsley, the various kinds of passages and how they are 
related, particularly his notions of introductory, exhibition and conclusive 
quality, and his idea of dominant and subordinate themes, can all be applied 
analogously to musical structure.  Some theorists discuss this form in 
anthropomorphic terminology such as: tension, climax, release.  In any case, 
the idea that beauty is to be found in the aesthetic form of the work is easily 
applied to music.  At the psychological level, however, to treat musical beauty 
as having a perceptual component in the same way as visual beauty, requires 
that the auditory perceptual module is set up in an analogous way to vision.  
The philosopher Diana Raffman treats auditory processing as such when 
developing an explanation for musical nuance ineffability44. 
Probably the most difficult art form to think of in terms of aesthetic 
form is performance; for example, theatre and opera.  In order for such 
performances to be viewed as beautiful requires a concentrated synthesis of 
both perceptual and intellectual relationships.  The coherence of the meanings 
constructed within the temporal unity which is the performance, and their 
relation to their extensions outside the performance; provide the basis from 
which the audience construct or apprehend the aesthetic form of the work.45  
In an analogous way, the viewer constructs the aesthetic form of the various 
contemporary branches of the visual arts: performance art, holograms, 
installation pieces and virtual realities. 
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5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, I have given an outline of how a unified theory of beauty 
might be developed. 
The unified form which the perceptual process gives to the array of 
sensations it picks up, is the source of our experience of beauty.  That is, when 
we experience beauty we are actually becoming aware of the processes which 
solve the problem of perception.  Hence the experience of beauty has neither a 
determinate perceptual analogue nor a determinate concept. 
If beauty is an experience of the principles involved in the construction 
of perceptual form and these principles are employed in a universal way for 
any particular form, we can say that purely perceptual beauty is universal and 
relatively unchanging.  That is, the way the perceptual principles are 
epitomized or challenged will be universal.  Intellectual beauty, on the other 
hand, is not so automatic.  In order to appreciate intellectual beauty, one must 
have the appropriate grasp of the concepts involved.  Hence, it is unlikely that 
intellectual beauty can significantly transcend cultural, experiential barriers.  
Furthermore, the kind of relations between concepts which give rise to 
harmony and unity; for example, the amount of tension that can be tolerated 
before a construct is no longer beautiful will be relative to cultures, 
individuals and even to stages throughout the one person's life time.  
According to this theory, beauty can be either predominantly perceptual or 
both perceptual and cognitive, and the degree to which perceptual beauty 
dominates the experience will be the degree to which a judgment of beauty 
can be considered to be universal and necessary. 
In order to understand aesthetic form or beauty, we ought not think of 
the configuration itself as the source of beauty, but the way the perceptual 
processes underlying form construction have been employed in the process of 
perceiving the object which stimulates the experience of beauty.  That is, the 
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source of beauty is the experience of perceptual processes solving the problem 
of perception of which we only become aware when the principles underlying 
this perceptual process are challenged or epitomized.  Thinking of the 
experience of beauty in this way resolves the apparent dichotomies 
surrounding our understanding of beauty.  In particular, it explains that 
peculiar phenomenology of beauty which leads us to the 'universal, 
unchanging - relative, dynamic' dichotomy. 
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